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An ISDS carve-out to support action on climate change 
Gus Van Harten1 
20 September 2015 
I. Overview 
In this report, I discuss how a multilateral agreement on climate change could be 
safeguarded against the risk of investor-state dispute resolution (ISDS) claims that 
target climate change action. The motivation behind the report is to support, and 
certainly not to undermine, a multilateral climate change agreement by drawing 
attention to the issue of an ISDS carve-out and suggesting detailed and strong 
language for a carve-out. 
In particular, I propose language for an ISDS carve-out that is informed by past 
interpretive approaches of ISDS tribunals, the importance of climate change action, 
and the potential deterrent that ISDS creates for governments considering such 
action. The suggested carve-out is as follows: 
“This Article applies to any measure adopted by a Party to this Agreement and 
relating to the objective of stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system or relating to any of the principles or 
commitments contained in Articles 3 and 4 of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change of 1992.  
Such a measure shall not be subject to any existing or future treaty of a Party to 
the extent that it allows for investor-state dispute settlement unless the treaty 
states specifically and precisely, with express reference to this Article and this 
Agreement, that this Article is overridden. For greater certainty, in the absence 
of such a reference in a future treaty between two or more Parties, the future 
1 Osgoode Hall Law School of York University; gvanharten@osgoode.yorku.ca. I am grateful to Stepan 
Wood for his comments on an earlier draft of this report. 
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treaty is presumed to include in full and without qualification the first three 
paragraphs of this Article. 
 
Any dispute over the scope or application of this Article shall be referred to, 
and fall within, the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of [specific body and process 
pursuant to the multilateral climate change agreement]. For greater certainty, 
no investor-state dispute settlement tribunal, arbitrator, body, or process has 
jurisdiction over any dispute related to the scope or application of this Article. 
 
The Parties shall not agree to any future treaty that allows for investor-state 
dispute settlement unless the future treaty incorporates in full and without 
qualification the language of the first three paragraphs of this Article. The 
Parties shall make best efforts to renegotiate any existing treaty with a non-
Party that allows for investor-state dispute settlement in order to ensure that 
the existing treaty incorporates in full and without qualification the language 
of the first three paragraphs of this Article.” 
 
This proposed language is aimed at ensuring a reliable carve-out to protect against 
risks of ISDS arbitration claims targeting climate change action. Some terms used in 
the carve-out, including “measure” and “investor-state dispute settlement” would 
require definition in a multilateral climate change agreement, as discussed below. If 
the carve-out were included in a multilateral climate change agreement, it would 
apply to all treaties allowing for ISDS among the states parties to that multilateral 
agreement. 
 
To support its reliability, any disputes about the scope or application of the carve-out 
should be referred to a decision-making body that is established and acts under the 
auspices of the multilateral climate change agreement, not an ISDS treaty. This would 
avoid the risk of evasive interpretation by ISDS tribunals and allow a forum that has 
direct expertise and institutional commitment concerning climate change action to 







These comments are supported by references to other documents and publications on 
ISDS. The citations below are to the author’s publications which in turn include more 
detailed discussion and extensive references to relevant data, past ISDS decisions, 
and secondary literature. 
 
A. Risks posed by ISDS to climate change action 
 
Faced with risks of uncapped financial liability due to ISDS claims, states may be 
deterred from implementing measures to fulfill their climate change responsibilities. 
In particular, ISDS poses a risk to climate change measures because: 
 
i. Multinational companies and wealthy foreign nationals have a unique legal 
right and the financial capacity to bring costly ISDS claims against states 
without first resorting to domestic courts or tribunals (where they offer justice 
and are reasonably available) for violations of foreign investor rights.2 Two 
common themes in the hundreds of ISDS cases thus far are disputes in the 
resource sector and disputes relating to public health or environmental 
protection measures.3 
 
ii. Foreign investor rights are often stated ambiguously in the treaties that allow 
for ISDS. In turn, such rights are subject to broad discretion of ISDS tribunals 
to decide issues of state liability.4 In various cases, ISDS tribunals have 
interpreted foreign investor rights in ways that require public compensation 
for general and public purpose changes to the state’s regulatory framework as 
applied indiscriminately to all asset owners.5 
 
                                                          
2 G Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2007), 110-
113. 
3 G Van Harten, Sovereign Choices and Sovereign Constraints: Judicial Restraint in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration (Oxford University Press, 2013), 82-89. 
4 Van Harten, note 1 above, chapter 4 and 122-124; Van Harten, note 2 above, 45-46. 
5 Van Harten, note 2 above, 52-54, 57-61, and 82-89. 
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iii. ISDS arbitrators have broad power over public budgets due to their authority 
to award uncapped amounts of compensation to foreign investors.6 States have 
no opportunity to avoid liability after the arbitrators issue their decision. Thus, 
states may face an incentive to avoid climate change action in order to limit 
their potential liability due to ISDS claims. 
 
To safeguard against the risk of ISDS claims that frustrate or deter climate change 
action, it is suggested that a multilateral climate change agreement should include a 
broad carve-out from all treaties that allow for ISDS arbitration.7 
 
B. Characteristics of a reliable carve-out 
 
1. Application to existing and future treaties that allow for ISDS 
 
For existing ISDS treaties, a carve-out in a multilateral climate change agreement 
should be designed as a subsequent legal agreement that would take precedence over 
the existing ISDS treaty. That is, the multilateral climate change agreement would be 
a subsequent agreement between its Parties to override all of their past treaties 
allowing for ISDS in matters subject to the carve-out. The states would be agreeing or 
clarifying in the multilateral climate change agreement that their existing consents, if 
any, to allow ISDS claims against them simply do not apply to climate change 
measures. 
 
For future ISDS treaties, the situation is more complicated. The carve-out from ISDS 
in a multilateral climate change agreement would need to be sufficiently specific in its 
prioritization of the carve-out over the Parties’ consents to ISDS in any future treaty 
allowing for ISDS. The carve-out proposed here aims to achieve this objective by 
referring to existing or future treaties and by including a requirement that any other 
treaty, in order for it to override the carve-out, must be specific and precise on the 
issue and, in particular, must expressly mention the carve-out in the multilateral 
                                                          
6 Van Harten, note 1 above, 101-109 and 145-149; Van Harten, Note 2 above, 113-114. 
7 The term “measure” should be defined broadly, as it is in many investment treaties, to include “any 
law, regulation, procedure, requirement or practice”. e.g. North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), Article 201; proposed Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA), Article X.01. 
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climate change agreement. The aim is not to encourage future overrides of the carve-
out but rather to preclude evasive interpretations by ISDS tribunals – which have, for 
example, regularly avoided exclusive jurisdiction clauses in contracts that appear to 
preclude the treaty claim8 – that would defeat the carve-out. 
 
For greater certainty, the carve-out also includes an obligation of each Party to 
reproduce the carve-out in any future ISDS treaty and a clarification that any future 
ISDS treaty among the Parties is presumed to include the carve-out. 
 
2. Application as between states that are party to the climate change agreement 
 
A carve-out from ISDS would only apply to ISDS treaties between or among states 
that are Parties to the multilateral climate change agreement. For example, a bilateral 
investment treaty (BIT) allowing for ISDS would be covered by the carve-out if both 
of the states parties to the BIT were also Parties to the multilateral climate change 
agreement. Similarly, a trade or investment treaty that was between more than two 
states and that allowed for ISDS (e.g. NAFTA, the Energy Charter Treaty) would be 
covered by the carve-out, albeit only for those states parties to the trade or 
investment treaty that were also Parties to the multilateral climate change agreement 
and even then only with an important caveat.9 
 
The carve-out would not apply, however, in the case of an ISDS treaty between, on 
the one hand, a state that is a Party to the multilateral climate change agreement and, 
on the other hand, a state that is not a Party. It would not apply because the ISDS 
treaty would not have been overridden by a subsequent agreement between the states 
                                                          
8
 Van Harten, note 2 above, 135-147. 
9 The caveat arises from Article 41 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This Article raises 
a significant prospect that an ISDS tribunal – established under a trade or investment agreement with 
more than two states parties, in a situation where at least one of those states parties had not ratified 
the multilateral climate change agreement – could decide that the ISDS carve-out did not apply in all 
cases brought under the relevant trade or investment agreement (including cases brought by an 
investor of a Party to the multilateral climate change agreement against another Party to that 
agreement) on the basis that (a) the carve-out affected the rights of the other states parties to the trade 
and investment agreement that were not Party to the multilateral climate change agreement or (b) the 
carve-out was incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose of the trade or 
investment agreement. This is a significant weakness in the reliability of the proposed ISDS carve-out 
for existing trade or investment agreements that have more than two parties. The weakness would be 
removed if all three or more states parties to the relevant trade or investment agreement (e.g. NAFTA, 




parties to the ISDS treaty. In light of this weakness, in its fourth paragraph the carve 
out establishes binding obligations of the states parties to include the carve out in 
future ISDS treaties and to make best efforts to renegotiate any existing ISDS treaty – 
with a state that is not a Party to the multilateral climate change agreement – in order 
to incorporate the carve-out into the existing treaty. The issue of how to enforce these 
negotiating obligations is left open with the expectation that they would become part 
of a general enforcement process in the multilateral climate change agreement. 
 
3. Application to the subject matter of climate change 
 
What is meant by “action” or “measures” on climate change? The approach adopted 
here is to include any measure linked to the objective, principles, or commitments of 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, which states for example:10 
 
“The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments 
that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with 
the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system….” 
 
By drawing on the language of the Framework Convention including the principles 
and commitments in Articles 3 and 4, the proposed carve-out is intended to apply to a 
wide range of state measures relating to climate change mitigation and adaptation as 
characterized ultimately in the Framework Convention, its other provisions and 
processes, and related climate change agreements. 
 
4. Connection between the carve-out and climate change action 
 
Government action on climate change can take many forms. The proposed carve-out 
has been framed broadly to encompass anticipated and unanticipated measures that 
states may adopt and thus to avoid deterring regulatory innovation. 
 
                                                          
10 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Article 2. 
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Many existing exceptions in ISDS treaties are unreliable because they use qualified 
language. For example, many existing ISDS exceptions apply only to state conduct 
that is shown to be “necessary” to achieve a regulatory aim or only where an ISDS 
award is shown to “prevent” the state conduct.11 This language creates significant 
uncertainty by leaving open the risk of unavoidable liability for the state, at the time 
of an ISDS award, if ISDS arbitrators decide that the state could have adopted some 
other measure instead of the impugned one or that the state is not prevented from 
adopting a measure merely because it must pay compensation for the measure. 
 
To avoid these uncertainties, the broader term “relating to” – used in some 
exceptions in ISDS treaties – has been adopted in the carve-out. This language allows 
for wider coverage and flexibility, while still putting a limit on wholly unrelated and 
thus arbitrary action by states by requiring some connection between the climate 
change objective and the measure said to be covered by the carve-out. 
 
5. Application to ISDS 
 
The carve-out applies to any existing or future treaty “to the extent that it allows for 
investor-state dispute settlement”. What is meant by “investor-state dispute 
settlement”? A multilateral climate change agreement should define this term based 
on the language used in existing treaties to establish states’ consents to ISDS. In 
particular, the definition could be linked to the types of treaties that typically allow 
for ISDS and to the specific rules under which ISDS claims are made. 
 
With this in mind, the following definition is proposed: 
 
“ISDS means any proceeding arising from a claim against a state where the 
claim is brought pursuant to (a) a treaty concerning international trade or 
foreign investment and (b) any of the following arbitration rules: the ICSID 
Convention (also known as the ICSID rules), the ICSID additional facility rules, 
the UNCITRAL arbitration rules, or any other arbitration rules including any 
                                                          
11 e.g. Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Article 33(2). 
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ad hoc arbitration rules and any arbitration rules agreed by the disputing 
parties.” 
 
This definition aims to capture all forms of investor-state arbitration proceedings 
under trade and investment treaties, but not state-state or non-arbitration 
proceedings. Therefore, the carve-out would apply to trade and investment treaties 
only to the extent that they give foreign investors the unique right to bring ISDS 
claims. Direct state-to-state proceedings and soft forms of ISDS – i.e. mediation or 
conciliation – would still be permitted in order to enforce foreign investor rights. It 
would be possible but complex, especially for state-to-state proceedings, to broaden 
the carve-out so that it applied to such proceedings. The present focus is informed by 
the fact that the vast majority of treaty-based ISDS claims have been investor-state 
arbitrations. 
 
Also, the definition would capture treaty-based investor-state arbitration but not 
investor-state arbitration pursuant to a state’s own legislation or a contract. To 
capture these other forms of ISDS, clause (a) would need to be removed. 
 
e. Avoidance of circular language 
 
Some ISDS treaties contain exceptions with circular language that limits or defeats 
the exception. For example, an exception may be limited to measures said to be 
“otherwise consistent with” the ISDS treaty.12 This language clearly undermines the 
exception and should be avoided in a carve-out for climate change action. 
 
g. Disputes over scope of the carve-out 
 
An important aspect of the uncertainty of state liabilities due to ISDS is the authority 
of ISDS tribunals to interpret ISDS exceptions narrowly. Various cases indicate this 
tendency of ISDS arbitrators.13 
 
                                                          
12 e.g. NAFTA, note 6 above, Article 1114. 
13 Van Harten, note 2 above, 66-68. 
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With this in mind, it is suggested that disputes over the applicability of a climate 
change carve-out should be referred to a decision-making body that is established 
under the auspices of a multilateral climate change agreement rather than an ISDS 
treaty. Such a body would have greater expertise and institutional commitment to 
ensure that the carve-out was interpreted to cover all forms of action reasonably 
aimed at climate change mitigation or adaptation. By locating this interpretive 
authority in a single body, uncertainties about varying or conflicting interpretations 
among diverse ISDS tribunals would also be avoided.14  
 
The language in the third paragraph of the carve-out aims to protect the exclusive 
jurisdiction of this body under the multilateral climate change agreement. The 
language is detailed and legalistic due to ISDS tribunals’ past record of taking 
jurisdiction over ISDS disputes even in the face of, for example, an exclusive 
jurisdiction clause in a related contract or a waiting period or fork-in-the-road clause 
in an ISDS treaty.15 
 
Beyond these points, questions about the body and process that should be used to 
resolve disputes about the ISDS carve-out are more a matter for experts in the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change than for ISDS experts. 
                                                          
14 G. Van Harten, “Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical Study of 
Investment Treaty Arbitration” (2012) 50 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 211, 237 and 245 (documenting 
conflicting approaches by tribunals to, e.g., the ambiguous foreign investor right to ‘most-favoured-
nation treatment’). 
15 Van Harten, note 2 above, 135-150. 
